Charleston v. State of Nevada, the poorly-conceived, ideologically-motivated lawsuit challenging the laws and ordinances permitting legalized prostitution in licensed brothels, has been dismissed by a federal court in Nevada.
The Nevada legislature, the state and its governor, Steve Sisolak had filed the motions in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. In March, The World Famous Mustang Ranch and its owner, Lance Gilman, sought to intervene in the lawsuit and filed their own Morion To Dismiss.
Tuesday, the District Court agreed with the defendants that the action should be tossed out.
The court’s order states in part:
While the Court empathizes with Plaintiffs for their lived experiences, the Court cannot adjudicate Plaintiffs’ claims because Plaintiffs fail to establish standing to confer jurisdiction upon this Court. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions to dismiss . . . .
It is therefore ordered that Defendants’ motions to dismiss [citation omitted] are granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) because Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that the Court has standing to exercise jurisdiction over this matter. The Court does not address any other grounds upon which Defendants sought dismissal.
It is further ordered that the pending motions to intervene [citation omitted] are denied as moot.
A history of nonsense
Plaintiffs Rebekah Charleston, Angela Delgado-Williams, and Leah Albright-Byrd had claimed they’re victims of sex trafficking that were ‘forced’ to travel to the state to engage in prostitution.
Backed by the same prohibitionists who lost spectacularly at the ballot box last year in their attempt to ban legal brothels, the women filed suit in United Stated District Court, claiming the Nevada laws permitting licensed brothels run afoul of the federal Mann Act, which criminalizes the interstate transport “of any woman or girl for prostitution, debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.”
See our discussion of the Mann Act, and its ignominious origins, here.
In its Motion to Dismiss, the state legislature had argued that:
A. Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply with the Court’s Local Rules because Plaintiffs have failed to provide any citations to or copies of the county ordinances that they claim are unconstitutional.
B. Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against all Defendants must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) because, at the time of filing the original complaint, Plaintiff Rebekah Charleston did not have Article III constitutional standing.
[A] plaintiff must show that he is under threat of suffering “injury in fact” that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury.
C. Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief against the State and Legislature and Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary relief against the Governor must be dismissed under FRCP 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) because those claims are not within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court under the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over federal claims that seek any type of relief against the State and its agencies, including the Legislature, and federal claims that seek monetary relief against state officials acting in their official capacity, unless the State has expressly waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated such immunity pursuant to its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. (citations omitted). Nevada has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.
D. Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief against the State and Legislature and Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary relief against the Governor must be dismissed under FRCP 12(b)(6) because Plaintiffs cannot obtain such relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a matter of law.
[I]n Rivera Concepcion v. Puerto Rico, 682 F.Supp.2d 164, 172 (D.P.R. 2010), the plaintiff brought claims under section 1983 against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its Legislative Assembly and claims under section 1983 for monetary relief against Jose Aponte and Kenneth McClintock in their official capacity as presiding officers of each legislative house. The district court dismissed all claims under section 1983 against these defendants, stating that:
The law is clear, however, that neither the Senate nor the Legislative Assembly, nor any agency or official representing the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may be considered a person pursuant to section 1983 for the purposes of liability. Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Legislative Assembly and all other branches of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and both Jose Aponte and Kenneth McClintock in their official capacities are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
E. Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief against the Legislature and Governor must be dismissed under FRCP 12(b)(6) because those claims are barred by absolute legislative immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a matter of law.
The federal common law provides state legislators with absolute legislative immunity in federal court for any civil claims arising from acts that fall within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-76 (1951); Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 403-06 (1979). Under absolute legislative immunity, state legislators are protected in federal court from having to defend themselves against civil claims challenging actions taken by them in their official legislative capacity, regardless of whether those claims seek monetary relief or declaratory and injunctive relief.
F. Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief against the Legislature and Governor must be dismissed under FRCP 12(b)(6) because those claims are time-barred as a matter of law under the statute of limitations applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
G. Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Governor must be dismissed under FRCP 12(b)(6) because the Governor is not charged with enforcing the challenged provisions of state and local law and is therefore not a proper party-defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a matter of law.
H. Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief must be dismissed under FRCP 12(b)(7) as a matter of law because Plaintiffs have failed to join all necessary and indispensable party-defendants under FRCP 19.
I. Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief against all Defendants must be dismissed under FRCP 12(b)(6) as a matter of law because the federal criminal laws do not preempt the challenged provisions of state and local law with regard to the licensing and regulation of legal brothels.
Out report on The Mustang Ranch’s Motion to a Dismiss can be found here.
Today’s Order dismissing the case issued by the Federal court in Nevada is reproduced in full below.
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